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I COMMENTS I
The Infeasibility of Federal Internet
Regulation: The Online Parental
Control Act of 1996-A Reaction to
the Communications Decency Act of
1996
1. Introduction
The Internet established a new frontier of commercial and
educational activity' where over 1.3 million2 "savvy businessmen,"
"conscious consumers," and academic persons cluster.' While
information is exchanged for commercial marketing, cultural
exchange, and acquisition of intellectual information, the Internet
also hosts an abundance of lewd and obscene written material and
1. See Malcolm McDonald, [socNZ--The Public Face of the Internet in New Zealand,
THE DOMINION (WELLINGTON), Nov. 18, 1996, at 4.
The "information superhighway," known as the Internet, provides access to
information contained in dictionaries, congressional press releases, scholarly papers, complete
works of literature by authors such as Shakespeare, current news, business information,
weather maps, sports updates, and product announcements, just to name a few. See Internet
Access Guide (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://wwwjustice.courts .... esearch/guide.html#FTP>.
2. See EDWARD A. CAVANOZ & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE & THE LAW; YOUR
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 10 (1994).
3. McDonald, supra note 1, at 4. Taken from the point of view of a publisher, the
Internet "constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide
audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers and buyers." Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
Ct. 2329, 2335 (1997).
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lifelike graphics.' Unfortunately, because no one person or entity
controls the content of information disseminated over the Internet,
children of all ages can access obscene material by using a personal
computer in the family home, local school, or library.' Speech,
pictures, and mini movies depicting hard core pornography are
available, with only the push of several key strokes, to all persons
connected to the Internet.' Parental guidance has proven ineffec-
tive in keeping Internet pornography out of the hands of innocent
children who are preyed upon by adults infatuated with children
and sex. Nonetheless, the apparent inability of some parents to
protect and guide their children does not necessarily impose a
burden on the federal government to assume this responsibility.
This comment explores the Internet's identity and the current
state of technology available via Internet access. In reaction to the
ready availability of pornography to minors, the federal govern-
ment passed the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") in an
effort to curb the dissemination of inappropriate materials through
threats of fines and imprisonment. However, two Federal courts
have issued injunctions proscribing the enforcement of the Act, and
the United States Supreme Court has declared portions to be
unconstitutional. In Part II, this comment explores the methods of
transmitting information over the Internet and the current
pornography problem that exists in American society due to the
ease of such transmission. Part III discusses the implications of
CDA and examines the constitutional reasons offered by the
federal courts in granting injunctions and by the Supreme Court in
declaring CDA unconstitutional. Part IV explores the Online
Parental Control Act of 1996 ("OPCA"), which was proposed by
California Representative Eshoo in reaction to the injunctions. The
differences between CDA and OPCA, the likelihood that OPCA
would withstand a constitutional attack, and the workability of such
controls over a worldwide amorphous system also are studied.
4. See John Browning, How Could We Tighten the A'et John Browning Argues that the
Internet Should be Censored-.But by the Users Themselves, Not State Action, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 24, 1996, at 28. See also BRENDAN P. KoHOE, ZEN AND THE ART OF
THE INTERNET 26 (1993).
5. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2334. See also United States v. Baker, 890 F.
Supp. 1375, 1390 (E.D. Mich. 1995); MARK GIBBS & RICHARD SMITH, NAVIGATING THE
INTERNET 10 (1993). See generally KOHOE, supra note 4, at 27.
6. See Browning, supra note 4, at 28; Internet Access Guide, supra note 1.
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Finally, in Part V, the comment discusses the feasibility of alterna-
tives to legislative regulation of the Internet.
I1. The Internet-"A Giant Network of Networks"
The Internet is a giant network of networks.7 A complex
computer family with members literally worldwide,8 its size is
nearly incomprehensible. A single network, or family member, is
created when one computer connects to one or more additional
computers, thus enabling the exchange of information between
them.' Once a single user on a personal computer connects with
another computer through standard telephone lines, all users in that
connection may interact as though no real physical distance
separates them; in reality, however, the users may be continents
apart.1" This "Global Web" of all linked computers and networks
is known collectively as the Internet."
In many ways the family members of the Internet are incog-
nito, coming and going as they please. Similarly, the precise
number of users participating in Internet activities is impossible to
determine at any given point in time 2 because users-new as well
as experienced-continuously enter and exit the network.t3
Nonetheless, over the past several years, numerous estimates have
been obtained and published. 4 As of 1981, the Internet connect-
7. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Technically, "[t]he
Internet is a network of networks all running the TCP/IP protocol suite, connected through
gateways, and sharing common name and address spaces." VIRGINIA SHEA, NETIOUE'TrE
25 (1994). Since its inception, the Internet has expanded into "a worldwide collection of
public and private networks, all loosely linked together." Internet Access Guide, supra note
1.
8. See Internet Access Guide, supra note 1.
9. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831; Internet Access Guide, supra note 1. Simply
put, a network is the manner in which two or more computers electronically communicate.
See PAUL HOFFMAN, THE INTERNET 4 (1994).
10, See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 2.
11. SHEA, supra note 7, at 10. The term "matrix" has become known to define all the
computers in the world which are linked and have the capability of exchanging electronic
mail. Additionally, the coined term "Cyberspace" refers to the "psychic space" whereby
people can communicate through computers. Id. at 20. See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. at 831.
12. See SHEA, supra note 7, at 26. See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831;
Randolph Stuart Sergent, The 'Hamlet' Fallacy: Computer Networks and the Geographic
Roois of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 672 (1996).
13. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
14. See Sergent, supra note 14, at 672. See also Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930
F. Stipp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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ed 213 host computers. 5 The number of connected host comput-
ers rapidly increased to 80,000 by 198916 and to 1,313,000 by
1993.17 Because some of these computers are accessed by more
than one person, the number of Internet users is even larger and,
in 1992, was estimated at ten to twenty-five million. 8 Of this
number, 2.2 million were active users.'9
Currently, the Internet includes more than 50,000 networks
that link approximately nine million host computers in more than
90 countries 0 According to estimates, this number will increase
to 200 million users by the year 19992 with users in nearly every
country," even those that remain undeveloped by economic
standards. In reality, the Internet is everywhere. It permeates
businesses, schools, libraries, governments, and homes.
A. Communication Over the Internet
The Internet is a valuable communication tool that facilitates
correspondence in two basic manners. First, it allows individuals
to share information directly with other connected users; secondly,
it enables individuals to post and retrieve specific information made
available by other users." The exchanged information may be
thought of as communication between members of a family in
which each user is a relative of the other. For instance, when one
family member (an Internet user) decides to communicate directly
and privately to one of his relatives (another Internet user), the two
family members use a one-to-one messaging system. The most
common form of this communication is electronic mail.24 A
common subform of this one-to-one messaging is the private e-mail
system where only persons within a certain defined group may
15. CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 10; Sergent, supra note 14, at 672.
16. See Sergent, supra note 14, at 672.
17. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 10.
18. See Sergent, supra note 14, at 672.
19. See STEVE BROWNE, THE INTERNET VIA MOSIAC AND WORLD WIDE WEB 2
(1994).
20. See Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
21. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
22. See HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 15.
23. See SHEA, supra note 7, at 21-22. See also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927.
24. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835; Internet Access Guide, supra note 1. When
using e-mail, the sender composes mail and then deposits the mail in a receiver's computer
mailbox. When the receiver signs on to his or her computer, a message will inform the
receiver that there is mail to be read. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 5; GIBBs
& SMITH, supra note 5, at 13; KOHOE, supra note 4, at 7; SHEA, supra note 7, at 22.
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communicate with other persons within that same defined group."
When using electronic mail, the communication is analogous to
mailing a closed letter through the traditional mail system in which
only the person to whom the message is addressed will have access
to the contents.
26
In addition to the one-to-one messaging systems, one-to-many
messaging systems allow for the posting and retrieval of informa-
tion by one family member (a user) to all of his/her other rela-
tives.27 Several systems provide such services. Telnet, a real time
remote computer utilization,28 facilitates access between a user
and other Internet nodes.29 Real time communication, commonly
known as Internet Relay Chat,3" allows connected users to write
messages to one another and have the recipient receive the
message almost instantaneously." Users may even chose to select
a group of fellow users and enter a private room to "talk" among
themselves. 2 File Transfer Protocol, commonly referred to as
FTRI is another form of one-to-many messaging that allows a user
to transfer files back and forth between Internet systems.
33
25. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 4. As contrasted with all Internet users,
private systems allow for communication between com!',any employees only. See id.
26. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("EPCA") of 1986 makes interception
of electronic messages sent over public systems illegal if the interceptor does not first obtain
a search warrant. See SHEA, supra note 7, at 126.
27. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835.
28. See id. See also Internet Access Guide, supra note 1.
29. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 4. When using Telnet, anyone on a
computer connected to the Internet may access any and all other Internet nodes as if
attached to a distant host. See id. Telnet is the main way on the Internet to create a connec-
tion with another remote machine. Telnet gives an Internet user the opportunity to be on
one computer system while conducting work on another system which may be either across
the street or thousands of miles away. See KOHOE, supra note 4, at 41.
30. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835.
31. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 8.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 5. A connected user in South Africa has the capability of copying a file
from California at an extraordinarily fast speed by using FTP. In addition, the user has the
ability to make files available to the public with great ease. See KOHOE, supra note 4, at 15.
This service is often times referred to "anonymous FTP" because users are not required to
have an Internet account on the computer being used. Rather, the user "FTP's" the
computer from which the user wants to download files and types in the word "anonymous"
instead of using a login name which could potentially identify the user. See Internet Access
Guide, supra note 1.
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Further, computer bulletin boards allow users to establish accounts
on remote systems and access basic features of the internet. 4
The public messaging system, which allows users to post
messages on a board that is open to the public, is often analogized
to a public restroom stall on which members of the public write
graffiti3 Any member of the Internet family may write a mes-
sage that all other family members may access and read at their
convenience. The absence of a controlling entity when coupled
with the innovative minds of Internet users often produce an
anarchy of sorts where the innocence of children becomes the
prized catch of the Internet hunter.
'The virtually unrestrained freedom offered through this
medium provides a trap in which innocent children can be seized
upon by adults transmitting pornographic, and otherwise generally
inappropriate, materials for minors. Unfortunately for children
with Internet access, many of these distributed message databases,
such as Usenet,36 are left unmonitored. This system should be
compared with private one-to-many messaging systems where all
messages are sent to a centralized location for monitoring before
being posted.37
A final form of one-to-many messaging is electronic publishing
such as the Nexis database, where newspapers, journals and
magazines are published on-line.38 While these databases may
contain inappropriate information for minors, the material
contained within these databases generally cannot be supplied by
individual Internet users.
34. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 3. It is on a computer bulletin board that
users read and post messages available to the general Internet public. See Internet Access
Guide, supra note 1. Computer Bulletin Boards often times cater to special interest groups
ranging from orinthology to Neo-Nazi white supremacists. See id. at 4.
35. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 6. See also KOHOE, supra note 4, at 15-16;
Internet Access Guide, supra note 1; SHEA, supra note 7, at 22.
36. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The concept of USENET
is very vague. It has been defined as "a set of machines that exchange articles tagged with
one or more universally-recognized labels, called newsgroups." KOHOE, supra note 4, at 25.
USENET has been referred to a "a cross between a campus coffee-house and a cooperative
news service." SHEA, supra note 7, at 27.
37, See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 6.
38. See id. at 7.
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B. Pornography Invades the Internet
While the Internet fosters "true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues
for intellectual activity,"39 the Internet also fosters the opportunity
for Internet family members to engage the children of this global
family in inappropriate communication.' Pornography is dissemi-
nated in text, pictures, and chat, all of which can be accessed
through bulletin boards, news groups, arid other forms of messaging
systems."1  The problem of Internet pornography is present and
growing as users continually discover new ways to transmit the
pornography.
As of October 1996, thousands of Internet family members had
received electronic messages from an American Online4" address
in which the sender openly offered to sell or exchange child porno-
graphy. 3 The content of the sender's message read:
Hi! I send you this letter because you were on a list of e-mail
addresses that fit this category. I am a collector of child porno-
graphy, and over the past 3 years, I have gathered quite a large
collection. I am selling these pictures, (or trading other pies) to
anyone who is interested. You can get them on normal Kodak
pictures, or get them on the computer in either GIF or JPG
format. I have created a catalog of all my products. There are
many video tapes, pictures, posters and audio recordings in the
catalog. I have boys ages 7 to 17, and girls aged 4 to 19.'
Unfortunately, due to the anonymity available to Internet users, the
police were unable to determine the identity of this message's
composer. 5 To this day, the composer is free to hide behind the
anonymity of the Internet and enlarge the underground world of
child pornography and abuse. For many users, anonymity may
39. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509(a)(3), 110 Stat. 56, 138
(West 1996) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)).
40. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
4 1. See id.
42, America Online is a commercial online server that provides Internet access for a fee.
See SHEA, supra note 7, at 28.
43. See AOL Accountls Figure in E-Mail Child Porn Investigation 10/21/96, NEWSBYTES,





actually serve as an enticement to compose and send such informa-
tion.
Although law enforcement occasionally succeeds in protecting
children, their efforts have been largely unsuccessful. In 1995, a
Michigan man was tried for transmitting, over a newsgroup, a story
graphically describing the rape, torture, and murder of a woman
who was given the same name as one of his college classmates.
This message was made available publicly over the Internet for all
to read.47 In cases such as this one, the Internet has been "lik-
ened to a newspaper with unlimited distribution and no locatable
printing press-and with no supervising editorial control. 48 Once
printed, anyone and everyone can read the material, and there is
no one with authority to check the content of the message.
Any feasible control over the dissemination of pornography on
the Internet requires a supervising editorial board, like that of a
magazine or newspaper, employed to filter through all posted
messages. However, both pornography and legally obscene
information is posted and retrieved on the Internet in the same
manner as all other information.49 Therefore, with unprecedented
ease, the strikes of several key strokes enables senders to achieve
world-wide distribution of their ideas.' However, unlike other
forms of communication, written and spoken, once information is
posted on the Internet, the content provider is unable to prevent
the information from entering certain communities.51 The receiver
remains completely anonymous to the sender, and, therefore, the
recipient could be "a 10 year old girl, and eighty year old man, or
a committee in a retirement community playing the role of Gonda
gathered around a computer."52 Even in one-to-one messaging,
the address of the receiver provides no "authoritative information"
about the receiver or others who may have access to the address.53
46. See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1995). The
defendant was criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) (1994) for transmitting threats
to injure or kidnap another over e-mail. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1378.
47. See id. at 1379.
48. Id. at 1390.
49. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
50. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1390.
51. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
52. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1386. In order to send a message, the composer need only
know an Internet address that, in and of itself, provides no definitive information about the
identity of the receiver. See KOHOE, supra note 4, at 7.
53. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845. See KotiOE, supra note 4, at 7.
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This creates an additional problem for many users. People who
desire to transmit sexually-laden messages only to other adults
cannot be certain that only adults will receive those messages. 4
Therefore, even self-censorship is not full proof in protecting
children.
C New Forms of Pornography Emerge
In addition to the anonymity of the users and the unrestricted
worldwide distribution of the messages, the ingenuity of users also
creates obstacles to the control of pornography over the Internet.
Because the desire to disseminate pornography appeals to some
users, these persons have created new forms of pornography that
add to the difficulty of creating legislatioa to ban its dissemination
to minors. Future laws must be broad enough to encompass, or
provide protection from, new forms of pornography such as
computer created pictures of children engaged in sexual acts.
Nevertheless, several arrests under current anti-pornography laws
have recently been made where non-traditional forms of porno-
graphy were involved."5
In September 1996, authorities arrested twelve persons
nationwide for allegedly exchanging digitized photographs of
children below the age of fourteen engaging in sexual acts56 over
America Online,57 a commercial online server?8 Digitized imag-
es are among the most readily available medium for exchanging
such pictures. 9  These images are created either with graphic
software or by scanning an existing image.6' The images are then
downloaded from a 335 or on-line service6 and displayed on any
computer equipped with viewers. 2 Pictures ranging from swimsuit
models to hard core pornography depicting homosexual acts,
54. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845.
55. See Jared Sandberg & Glenn Simpson, Porn Arrests Inflame Debate on New Laws,
UNION TRIB. (San Diego), Sept. 19, 1995, at 3 (Co nputer Link). Traditional forms of
pornography, such as child pornography, are alread) covered by state laws. As of 1982,
twenty states had already enacted legislation that proh bited material which depicted children
in sexual conduct whether or not the material was even judged to be obscene. See New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
56. See Sandberg & Simpson, supra note 56, at 3.
57. See id.
58. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 2-3.
59. See id. at 90.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 91.
62. See id. at 90. Viewers is a computer program. See id.
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bondage, and sadomasochism have been transferred over the
computers.6 3  Pornography is also transferred through animated
sequences,' sexually explicit text,65 and hot chat.66
In addition to pornographers creating new mechanisms for
transferring information on their own, some Internet providers
actually encourage these actions.6 The providers use sex as a lure
to entice users to subscribe to their services.6" For example, one
newspaper advertisement read "Unlimited! Uncensored!" while
showing a computer screen featuring "XXX" and "Erotica."69
Clearly, on-line providers thrive on "sexually laden communica-
tion"70 and consumers are responding. If innocent children are to
be protected, some form of change is required.
D. Is Anyone Out There?-Controlling the Internet
While the need to control pornography dissemination over the
Internet is great, content control by a single agency is nearly, if not
completely, impossible considering the vast amount of information
disseminated, the instantaneous transmission of the info.rmation,
and the infinite number of users who enter and exit the Internet at
any given moment.7 The Internet consists of all computers on all
existing networks and the cables connecting cables.72 No central-
63. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 91.
64. Animated sequences are created either by graphics software or by scanning existing
images by which the illusion of movement is given. Such images are similar to a short movie.
See id,
65. Sexually explicit text generally consists of messages posted on a variety of messaging
systems and, at times, over e-mail. The messages often times are in the form of short erotic
stories and are easily modified by recipients of the text. See id. at 92.
66. Hot chat is sexually explicit text that is communicated nearly instantaneously in real
time on-line. See id. at 92.




71. See GIBBS & SMITH, supra note 5, at 10, KOHOE, supra note 4, at 15; SHEA, supra
note 7, at 26-27. See also Andrew Kantor, CDA Watch: DoJ Proposes Tagging Underage
Users, INTERNET WORLD, July 1996, at 16 (finding that 40% of the information transmitted
over the Internet is created offshore). See also discussion infra Part III.
72. See HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 14. Other common words used at times to refer to
the Internet are Cyberspace and The Matrix. Cyberspace is the "psychic space" where
individuals communicate through computers. The coined term "The Matrix" refers to all
computers which are connected in a world that can exchange electronic mail. See SHEA,
supra note 7, at 20. The Internet began in early 1969 under the name ARPANET
(Advanced Resaerch Projects Agency) in the United States Department of Defense. At its
very first stage, ARPANET consisted of four computers and was designed for wartime so
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ized storage location, control point, or communications channel
exists for the Internet.
73
Accordingly, no single entity, whether it be academic,
commercial, or governmental, actually administers the Internet.74
"Anyone can make any kind of information available,....
ITfhere is no one place to complain about something on the
Internet, as each site on the Internet is responsible for its own
content" 75  While the Internet Society ("ISOC") is the main
group attempting to oversee the Internet and the content trans-
ferred over it, ISOC has absolutely no official governmental power
and cannot sanction users for improper or illegal uses.76 There-
fore, unless ISOC is granted the necessary enforcement power, any
federal law would be ineffective in controlling information sent into
the United States from foreign countries. However, the exchange
of information over the Internet needs to be controlled as a
decrease in the amount of pornography transmitted over the
Internet would decrease the size of the threat to American
children.
III. Controlling Internet Pornography--The Communication
Decency Act of 1996
In an attempt to control the flow of obscene and offensive
material to minors, President Clinton signed the Communications
Decency Act of 1996"7 ("CDA") into law on February 8, 1996.78
This Act, which composes part of title V of the Telecommunica-
tions Act, 79 represents the first comprehensive initiative by the
that connected computers could continue communication should one of the computer
connections be destroyed. See GIBBS & SMITH, supra note 5, at 10.
73. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996); GIBBS & SMITH, supra
note 5. at 10.
74. See KOHOE, supra note 4, at 27. See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832.
However, the Internet Society, ISOC, does voluntarily "run" the Internet. See GIBBS &
SMITH, supra note 5, at 10. The Internet is neither owned by the American government nor
is it solely owned by American corporations. See What's New (visited Feb. 1, 1997)
<http://www-eshoo.house... ml#Internet Censorship>.
75. HOFFMAN, supra note 9, at 17.
76. See id. at 18.
77. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 223, 110 Stat. 56, 133
(1996).
78. CDA was first introduced by Senator Jim Exon (D-Neb.). See Mike Godwin, An
Il-Defined Act, INTERNET WORLD, June 1996, at 90.
79. § 223(m), 110 Stat. at 133. The primary purpose of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 was actually to reduce regulation and encourage development of new technology. By
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federal government to control pornography on the Internet. 
8 0
Section 502 of CDA amends title 47, section 223 of the United
States Code by inserting:
(d) whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly--
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a
specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display
in a manner available to a person under 18 years of
age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal
image or other communication that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether
the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility
under such person's control to be used for an activity
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used
for such activity shall be fined under title 18, United States
Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."1
The language of the new Act places the welfare of children in high
regard and clearly informs the public as to what Internet acts will
not be tolerated. However, as was quickly pointed out to the
federal government, first impressions are often deceiving. Before
the effectiveness of the Act had an opportunity to be tested, the
immediate enforcement of the provisions was proscribed.82
On the same day the Act was signed into law,83 the American
Civil Liberties Union and others 4 sought a preliminary injunction
and large, the Act has nothing to do with the Internet, but rather, the Act was to promote
competition among local telephone services as well as multichannel video markets and over-
the-air broadcasters. The provisions of CDA were added either during executive committee
hearings or as amendments during floor debate. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2337-
38 (1997).
80. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
81. § 223(d)(1)-(2), 110 Stat. at 133-34 (47 U.S.C. § 223(b) is commonly known as the
Telephone Decency Act). This legislation applies the current Federal Communications
Commission's definition of indecency to the Internet. See Godwin, supra note 79, at 90.
82. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 827.
83. See id.
84, The other plaintiffs included: Human Rights Watch, Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Journalism Education Association, Computer
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arguing that CDA violated both the First and Fifth Amendments
of the Federal Constitution," Granting the preliminary injunction,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania concluded that the ACLU had a good chance of
success in meeting the burden of proving the statute unconstitu-
tional for vagueness in regulating, through the use of criminal
sanctions, patently offensive material.86 Thereafter, on June 12,
1996, in reaction to the constitutional attack against the Act
initiated by the ACLU, "a panel of three federal judges elevated
the Internet to a level of importance commensurate with the
printed work by declaring unconstitutional the government's efforts
to outlaw indecent material on the Internet."87 Since its enact-
ment, CDA has never been used in the fight against Internet
pornography. Now that the Supreme Court has declared CDA
unconstitutional,88 the feasibility of Congress' goals will never be
proven.
A. CDA Ruled Void for Vagueness
In its constitutional attack on CDA, the ACLU successfully
convinced the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania that sections 223(d)(1) and 223(d)(2) of CDA were
void for vagueness.89 Vagueness is of special concern to the Court
when, as with CDA, the regulation is content based.90 The
Professions for Social Responsibility, National Writers Union, Clarinet Communications
Corp., Institute for Global Communications, Stop Prisoner Rape, AIDS Education Global
Information System, Bibiobytes, Queer Resources Directory, Critical Path Aids Project, Inc.,
Wildcat Press, Inc., Declan McCullagh dba Justice on Campus, Brock Meeks dba Cyberwire
Dispatch, John Troyer dba The Safer Sex Page, Jonathan Wallace dba The Ethical Spectacle,
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. See id.
85. See id. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, adopted in 1791,
protects an individual's freedom of expression stating "Congress shall make no law abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fifth Amendment, also adopted in
1791, protects a person's due process rights stating "No person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 856-57. But see Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v.
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 936-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding the Act unconstitutional because
it was overbroad; not void for vagueness).
87. Jorgen Wouters, Court Slaps Congress' Hand in Rejecting CDA, INFORMATION &
INTERAcTIVE SERVICES REPORT, June 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Current
News File.
88. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 . Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997),
89. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 852. But see Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 937.
90. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
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vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amendment
concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.91
Under a due process analysis, in order for a law not to be
found void for vagueness and, therefore, not violative of due
process, the legislation must establish minimal guidelines to govern
law enforcement so that a criminal statute does not provide for "a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors and jurors
to pursue their personal predilections."92 According to the void
for vagueness doctrine, "a penal statute must define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness so that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."93 If the
language of the Act does not satisfy such criteria, under a due
process analysis, the law will be found void for vagueness and
therefore unconstitutional and unenforceable.
When evaluating the language of a criminal statute, the
language need not be so exact as to cover every possible factual
situation; a law is valid despite doubts concerning applicability of
the law in marginal factual situations.94 Simply, the core of the
void for vagueness doctrine is that laws must provide a "rough idea
of fairness. It is not a principle designed to covert into a constitu-
tional dilemma the practical difficulties in drawing criminal statutes
both general enough to take into account a variety of human
conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain
kinds of conduct are prohibited .... ."" The law only needs to
contain reasonable standards in order to guide prospective human
91. See id.
92. Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 470 A.2d 1339, 1342-43 (Pa. 1983). This case rejected
the argument that a drunk driving law setting the blood alcohol level for driving under the
influence at 0.10% was void for vagueness because the average person cannot determine the
last drop of alcohol that one can drink before exceeding the limit. See id. (quoting Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (holding that California state law requiring persons to
provide police officers with "credible and reliable" identification upon request was void for
vagueness since it was at the discretion of the officer to determine what type of identification
is credible and, therefore, the law was prone to arbitrary enforcement)).
93, Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1367 (Pa. 1986) (over-
lapping criminal provisions allowing prosecutors to chose between which crime to chare are
not void for vagueness) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357). See also Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (finding that a disorderly conduct law sufficiently advises the public
as to which conduct is proscribed and therefore is not void for vagueness).
94. See Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. 1976) (holding that law
was not void for vagueness because the state law proscribing lewd behavior sufficiently
notified persons that public masturbation was proscribed by the law).
95. Mikulan, 470 A.2d at 1343 (quoting Colten, 407 U.S. at 110).
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conduct.' Therefore, simply because the legislature could have
used clearer and more precise language when drafting the legisla-
tion, the law is not automatically unconstitutionally vague.97 Due
process will be satisfied so long as the law contains reasonable
standards to guide prospective conduct. 8
However, it is questionable whether CDA effectively guides
prospective human conduct and sufficiently informs individuals with
respect to conduct prohibited on the Internet. CDA proffers an
indecency standard based on contemporary community stan-
dards.9 Accordingly, a picture of a naked woman is prohibited
as "patently offensive" if the "applicable community" judges nudity
to be "patently offensive." However, if the community is more
liberal, it may not judge nudity to be "patently offensive" and the
picture would not be illegal in that particular community."
Legality, therefore, does not depend on the content of a message
or picture but rather on the ideas of a particular community. When
the identity of the receiver cannot be known with certainty, the
sender once again cannot assure the legality of the act.
In ACLU v. Reno,"" the district court, in evaluating CDA,
found that sections 223 (d)(1) and (d)(2) did not sufficiently
describe what type of information would be deemed "patently
offensive" and, therefore, what type of information would be
proscribed from an interactive computer service transmission.0 2
A strong argument made by the ACLU, and accepted by the court,
was that because the "patently offensive" determination is based on
community standards, a person creating speech over the Internet
lacks a reliable manner by which to determine the standard a court
96. See Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d at 1367.
97. See Heinbaugh, 354 A,2d at 246. See also United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94,
96 (1975).
98. See Mikulan, 470 A.2d at 1343.
99. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct, 2329, 2345 (1997).
100. See id. The Court noted:
[The d]eterminations of "what appeals to the 'pruri ent interest' or is 'patently
offensive' . . are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big
and too diverse for this court to reasonably expect that such standards could be
articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite
consensus exists . .
Id. at 2345 n.39.
101. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
102. See id. at 852.
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will employ if the content is challenged,"3 Exactly who comprises
"the community" is unclear when the medium transmits informa-
tion nearly instantaneously to unknown recipients worldwide.
B. Who Comprises the Internet Community?
If individual Internet users are considered single members of
a large and complex family structure that spans across the globe,
what is the community in which this family lives? One answer may
be that it is the entire world since all the members can openly, and
nearly simultaneously, communicate with one another. Another
possible answer is that the community is ever changing and is
determined by those who are actively using the Internet at a given
moment. Yet, another possible answer is that there are many
communities existing within the Internet, and an individual
community must be determined by the persons who are communi-
cating with one another. Currently, courts have not determined the
applicable standard for establishing the Internet community, and
this creates exorbitant, and possibly insurmountable, hurdles when
the legislature attempts to regulate."° However, CDA expressly
states that community standards must serve as the basis in the
determination of what is "patently offensive."' 5 Ironically, CDA
fails to provide any guidance on how the community is defined.
Absent legislation to the contrary, the "community" for the
Internet is literally the world. Therefore, setting a definable
standard is nearly impossible when "[mlaterial routinely acceptable
according to the standards of New York City, such as the Broad-
way play Angels in America which concerns homosexuality and
AIDS portrayed in graphic language, may be far less acceptable in
smaller, less cosmopolitan communities of the United States."'"
This distinction clearly will create a bed of confusion in the
reasonable, but not yet legally trained, mind.
As further illustration of the vagueness inherent in CDA, the
Act outlaws the depiction of excretory organs in forms judged
"patently offensive" based on community standards."7 Depend-
103. See id. at 852-53. However, the Supreme Court never addressed the issue of an
indefinable community standard. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
104. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
105. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 223(d)(1)(B), 110 Stat.
56, 134 (1996).
106, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 852-53.
107. See § 223(d)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 134.
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ing on the community, a news articles about female genital
mutilation occurring in Africa may be found "patently offensive"
in one community while seen as newsworthy in other communi-
ties.1 8 Because of such differences in communities, an Internet
sender could never feel secure that the message would not subject
him to incarceration. Based on an inability to define the Internet
community standard and, therefore, the standard by which to judge
"patently offensive" material, CDA was found to be potentially
void for vagueness and the court issued an injunction barring its
enforcement.1 9 However, this issue was never addressed by the
Supreme Court. In its decision, the Supreme Court stated:
"[WIhile we discuss the vagueness of the CDA because of its
relevance to the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, we
conclude that the judgement should be affirmed without reaching
the Fifth Amendment issue. ' ...
C. The Indefinable "Indecency Standard" Creates a Vague and
Overbroad Act
In addition to CDA being declared void for vagueness by the
ACLU court based on an inability to define the applicable
community by which to apply the relevant standard, three different
courts found the term "patently offensive," as contained in CDA,
to be void due to its vagueness and overbroadness. " ' The
meaning of "indecent" has been challenged in several courts on the
basis that it is void for vagueness and the term has been assigned
an evolving meaning. In 1882, the Circuit Court of Kentucky
defined indecent as immodest and impure, although language that
was simply course, unbecoming, or profane was not considered to
be within the boundaries of the term.'12 More than thirty-five
years later, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed
the meaning of "indecent" and declared that it meant all "matter
of a character tending to incite murder or assassination."
113
Neither court was successful in providing a workable and compre-
hensive definition of indecency.
108. See id. at 853.
109. See id.
110. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341 (1997).
111. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 824; Shea ex ret. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
112. See United States v. Smith, 11 F. 663, 665 (Ky. Cir. 1882).
113. Magon v. United States, 248 F. 201, 202-03 (9th Cir. 1918).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
As the morals of society evolved, so did the application of the
indecency standard. A Maryland statute outlawed pornography
using the words "lewd, obscene or indecent" to describe the
prohibited acts."4  While the court recognized that in common
layman language these three words may have different shades of
meaning, the court refused to distinguish lewd and indecent from
obscene."5 Any differentiation would invalidate the statute as
creating an impermissible standard for a criminal trial due to
vagueness."' 6 Therefore, the court determined that in order for
the statute to be constitutional, the terms lewd, indecent, and
obscene must be defined as:
1) The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prurient interest in sex.
(A) where the material is designed for and primarily
disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group,
rather than the public at large, the prurient-appeal require-
ment is satisfied if the dominant. in theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of
the members of that group.
2) The material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters.
3) The sexual material is utterly without redeeming social
value." 7
Even though the court accepted this definition of indecent, it
recognized that the definition was not precise; individuals may
experience confusion over whether something is indecent.5 8
Nevertheless, as a general rule, the lack of precise terminology does
not, in and of itself, make the term offensive to the principles of
due process."9 Defined in this manner, indecent was interpreted
as constitutional and its usage continued.
114. Donnenberg v. State, 232 A.2d 264,267 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (interpreting MD.
ANN. CODE OF 1957 art. 27, § 418(a)-(b)).
115. Seeid.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 268.
118. See id. at 272 (quoting Levin v. State, 228 A.2d 487, 490 Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967).
119. See Donnenberg, 232 A.2d at 272.
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CDA prohibits the use of an interactive computer service to
transmit "patently offensive" material to minors.t2°  Because
CDA does not define the meaning of "patently offensive" within
the Act itself, the ACLU court concluded that the terms "patently
offensive" and "indecent" could be used interchangeably to
determine the reach of CDA.12' As opposed to the generally
accepted obscenity standard, in writing CDA, Congress was far
more reaching in the types of speech it proscribed. t22 It was
precisely this action that left the doors open for First Amendment
activists to win injunctions barring CDA's enforcement.
The hallmark of the obscenity standard is that proscribed
material is limited to that which appeals to the prurient interest of
the community irrespective of its significance and social value."z
For, when Congress wrote CDA, it failed to include an exclusion
for the transmission of socially valuable material.124 By using the
term "indecent," Congress created a new meaning that disposed of
the exception for indecent speech containing social value. Leaving
aside the problem of an indefinable community standard, it is
questionable whether reports of genital mutilation can be outlawed
if the reports have educational value. Under a strict interpretation
of CDA, the Government could suppress a report concerning such
information. 25 Congress, in eliminating an exclusion for socially
valuable indecent speech, exceeded its powers.
CDA's attempt at proscribing the transmission of patently
offensive material over interactive computer devices is an over-
reaching curtailment of the First Amendment freedom of expres-
120. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 223(d)(10)(B), 110 Stat. 56,
134 (1996).
121. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 850 (E.D. Pa. 1996). This court used the
same analysis as the Donnenberg Court in attempting to differentiate lewd from obscene
when the statute itself provided no definitions of the terms. The Supreme Court found that
the two parts of CDA use different linguistic forms, one portion uses the word "indecent"
while another uses "patently offensive." The Court found that "[g]iven the absence of a
definition of either term, this difference in language will provoke uncertainty among speakers
about how the two standards relate. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997).
122. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 855,
123. See id.
124, See id. See also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2345.
125, See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45. In analyzing the vagueness of CDA, the
Court writes: "In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA
threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation.
[This] may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably
unlawful words, ideas, and images." Id.
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sion126 in addition to being unconstitutionally vague. The court's
decision to grant an injunction "had nothing to do with Internet-
based obscenity or child pornography per se, which already are
illegal and were not in fact challenged" by the plaintiffs. 127
Rather, the injunction issued by the judges and the opinion of the
Supreme Court was based on the portions of CDA which prohibit
"indecent" and "patently offensive" material on the Internet.
1 28
Unlike the term "obscene," the terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive" have never been formally defined by the courts. As a
result, discussions concerning important issues such as abortion,
AIDS, and breast cancer are 129 For this reason, Congress
overstepped constitutional boundaries when it included non-
pornographic constitutionally protected adult speech within the
scope of CDA. 30  Therefore, in reaching their decision, the
district court reasoned: "Whatever the strength of the interest the
government has demonstrated in preventing minors from accessing
'indecent' and 'patently offensive* material online, if the means it
has chosen sweeps more broadly than necessary and thereby chills
the expression of adults, it has overstepped onto rights protected
by the First Amendment.'. 3  Not only was the Act unconstitu-
tionally vague, it was also overbroad in its scope and violative of
adults' First Amendment right to free speech. 32 Balancing the
scales of justice, adult freedoms weighed more heavily than the
126. See Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. ieno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 855. However, the Shea court did not find CDA to be void
for vagueness. Rather this court granted an injunction solely on the argument that the
statute was unconstitutional for being overbroad and curtailing adult protected speech other
than pornography.
127. Wouters, supra note 88.
128. See id.
129. See id. If a person is unable to understand the types of speech that are proscribed,
a certain amount of allowable speech is certain to be stifled.
130. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854. In Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the United States Supreme Court declared that a state may
establish two standards for determining the meaning of obscene speech, one as applied to
children and one as applied to adults. See id. at 634. Materials which are constitutionally
protected for adults are not necessarily constitutionally protected for children. See id. at 636.
The state may prohibit the sale to minors materials that appeal to the prurient interest of a
minor while the same material may not be prohibited from being distributed to adults unless
the material appeals to the prurient interest of the adult. See id. at 632-34,
131. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854. See also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,
2346 (1997).
132. See Wouters, supra note 88. See also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950; ACLU v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. at 855.
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governmental interest in protecting childhood innocence. The
Supreme Court concluded: "'Regardless of the strength of the
government's interest in protecting children, the level of discourse
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would
be suitable for a sandbox."
' 33
D. Affirmative Defenses-Can They Save CDA?
The federal government argued that, even if CDA was
unconstitutional based on its vagueness and overbreadth in the
scope of the law, it was constitutional due to the affirmative
defenses provided within the Act.'34 Under the express terms of
the statute, any person subject to CDA has a complete affirmative
defense to prosecution if the person:
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appro-
priate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent
access by minors to a communication specified in such subsec-
tions, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict
minors from such communications, including any method which
is feasible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communications by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or
adult personal identification number. 35
Unfortunately, the court found that "[c]urrent technology provides
no feasible means for most providers to avail themselves of" these
two affirmative defenses. 36  Thus, CDA provides only useless
defenses that fall short of meeting the government's burden of
negating the unconstitutionality of the Act and, consequently,
provides no reason for the court to uphold the constitutionality of
CDA.
The second affirmative defense, which negates the liability of
any content provider who restricts the access of the message's
content through such means as credit card verification and access
codes, provides no protection for providers of the majority of the
133. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing Bolgen v. Youngstown Products Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983)).
134. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56,134 (1996).
Again, the Shea court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitutional due to
vagueness, See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 937.
135. § 223(e)(5)(A)-(B), 110 Stat. at 134.
136. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950. See aLso Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2350.
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available forms of on-line communication"' Most content
providers, such as America Online and CompuServe, cannot
determine the recipients of outgoing messages posted on systems
like bulletin boards and chat groups. Therefore, no manner exists
for these providers to restrict access through personal codes or
accounts.3  This type of restriction would eliminate bulletin
boards, which operate in such a manner and are a major source of
commercial and intellectual information, from the Internet.
39
These systems transmit perfectly decent and valuable materials.
Nonetheless, this speech would be eliminated when the risk of
providing service to a bulletin board becomes potentially illegal.
Furthermore, an identity verification defense is meaningless to
users of FTP and Gopher."4 Only users of the World Wide Web,
the only on-line system for which some form of verification is
possible, could potentially benefit from this affirmative defense. 4'
As to the feasibility of the first defense which includes using
available technology to restrict access of inappropriate content to
minors, the availability of the defense is limited to those areas of
the Internet where reasonable and effective means of restriction of
indecent communication to minors exists. 42 The same argument
made with regard to the feasibility of the identification verification
defense to Bulletin Boards is likewise applicable to this defense.
Furthermore, no affirmative defense to liability exists based on the
fact that no feasible means of limitation exists. 43  For these
reasons, the court determined that the defenses do not "provide a
safe harbor in a substantial number of circumstances" and that the
plaintiff's constitutional challenge would prevail. 44  Essentially,
since no feasible way exists for an Internet access provider or
137. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942; Godwin, supra note 79, at 90.
138. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942.
139. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 4. See also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942.
140. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942. FTP enables the user to download information from
other computers while the user remains anonymous. Gopher allows a user to explore the
information made available over the Internet by selecting resources or other Gopher services
from a menu. See Internet Access Guide, supra note 1.
141. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942-43. The World Wide Web is composed of servers and
browsers who use this "wide-area hyper media information retrieval initiative" to access
written text, images, videos and audios over the Internet. See Internet Access Guide, supra
note 1. Essentially, the provider could require the use of an identification password or credit
card number before allowing access to the World Wide Web.
142. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 943.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 944.
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sender of information to utilize technology to block transmission of
the information to minors, the provided defense is useless and the
decision to bar enforcement of CDA would stand.
IV. The Online Parental Control Act of 1996: A Reaction to
CDA
Assuming that the battle against Internet pornography was lost
when the Supreme Court declared the relevant portions of CDA
unconstitutional, the war is far from over. In reaction to the
various injunctions barring the enforcement of CDA, Congress-
woman Eshoo 45 introduced House Bill 3089, known as the
Online Parental Control Act of 1996 ("OPCA").146 'This Act is
aimed at amending the Communications Act of 1934 in order to
provide parents with greater control over the material accessed by
their children on the Internet while still respecting the freedom of
speech granted to adults under the First Amendment.
147
OPCA, originally co-sponsored by five Democratic representa-
tives," has since gained the support of twenty-three co-spon-
sors. 19  The sponsors believe that, if enacted, the Bill will place
parents in the "driver's seat" by allowing them to determine which
information is proper for their children while continuing to
145. Anna Eshoo is a Democrat in the House of Representatives serving the majority of
California's Silicon Valley. First elected in 1992, Representative Eshoo serves on the House
Commerce Committee and the Telecommunications Subcommittee. See An Interview with
Congresswoman Anna Eshoo-Communications Decency Act Under Fire, COMM. WEEK,
Apr. 15, 1996, at IA08. Eshoo supported the enactment of the Telecommunications Reform
Bill which included CDA despite the fact that she strongly opposed the Internet censorship
provisions contained within. See Passage of the Telecommunications Reform Bill (visited Feb.
1, 1997) <http://www-eshoo.house . . . ml#Internet Censorship>. She also voted for the
Cox/Wyden Amendment aimed at prohibiting governmental regulation cf the Internet
stating: "[I]n my view, the government shouldn't be policing computer networks such as the
Internet and I'm very concerned that such activity infringes on every American's First
Amendment right to freedom of speech." Statement in Opposition to Internet Censorship
(visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www-eshoo.house ... ml#lnternet Censorship>.
146. Online Parental Control Act of 1996, H.R. 3089, 104 th Cong. (1996).
147. See id. See also Background, Questions, and Answers: The Online Parental Control
Act of 1996 (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www-eshoo.house.gove./opcaqun.html> [hereinafter
Background, Questions, & Answers].
148. House Bill 3089 was originally co-sponsored by Representatives Pelosi (D-Ca),
Dellums (D-Ca), Farr (D-Ca), Gejdenson (D-Ct), and Woolesey (D-Ca). See Eshoo
Introduces Online Parental Control Act; Strengthens Parental Control of Online Materials,
Eliminated Indecency Standard, CONG. PRESS RELEASE, Mar. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Current News File [hereinafter Eshoo Introduces OPCAI.
149. See Eshoo Welcomes Court Injunction on Internet Censorship Law, CONG. PRESS
RELEASE, June 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Current News File.
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safeguard the First Amendment protection given to adult communi-
cation. To accomplish this goal, OPCA not only replaces CDA's
"indecency" standard with a "harmful to minors" standard, but also
includes additional affirmative defenses for employers and content
providers. Legislators are placed in the predicament of protecting
children in a manner that will ultimately withstand constitutional
attack.
A. The First Atm #ndment Standard
Any federal regulation of the Internet must coincide with the
personal freedoms afforded by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Irrespective of the social value, the First
Amendment grants all persons the right to receive information and
ideas.15 In reaction to pornography, the 1969 Supreme Court in
Stanley v. Georgia recognized that "[i]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch." '' Nevertheless, when a person attempts to
disseminate such material in the privacy of his own home through
the use of a personal computer connected with an Internet service
provider, the federal government frantically attempts to regulate
and prohibit the conduct for fear of such material reaching minors.
Even though the actual language of the First Amendment may
contain unconditional phrasing, courts have repeatedly recognized
that it was never intended to protect every utterance; libeloous
statements are one such example. 52 During the colonial period,
ten of the fourteen states that ratified the 1792 Constitution "gave
no absolute protection to every utterance."'53 Since then, courts
have continually held that individual states have a legitimate
interest in prohibiting the dissemination and exhibition of obscene
material. This state interest outweighs an individual's interest in
free expression when the materials create a significant danger of
150. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See supra note 86 (concerning the
First Amendment).
15t. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
152. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957).
153. Id. at 483. See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
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offending unwilling recipients and juveniles.'54 It is the goal of
OPCA to protect such individuals.
In 1957, for the first time ever, the Supreme Court directly and
formally considered whether obscenity is speech within the ambit
of the First Amendment. 5 The Court in Roth v. United States
determined that "[o]bscene material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest" is not protected and, thus,
adopted the Hicklin test to determine the legal obscenity of certain
materials. 16  According to the Hicklin test, "the true test in
deciding obscenity is whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest."'57
This is the standard adopted by OPCA, except the prurient interest
test is applied to minors rather than the "average person." By
using the Hicklin test as a model for the "harmful to minors"
standard, OPCA has a greater chance of surviving constitutional
attacks.
B. A New Standard-Harmful to Minors
CDA established an outright ban on the use of telecommunica-
tion devices to provide "indecent" material to persons under
eighteen years of age, and criminal penalties were instituted for
violation of this ban.'58 Eshoo believes such a ban, based on an
"indecency" standard, violates freedom of speech due to its
potential broadness.'59 Therefore, in reaction to her belief, Eshoo
has promulgated OPCA which replaces the "indecency" standard
with the "harmful to minors" standard.16
154. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973). See also Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567;
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968). The protection of the psychological
well-being of a child is a compelling state interest. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 757 (1982).
155. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 4.). Up until this time, the Court had always assumed that
obscenity was not protected.
156. Id. at 487-90.
157. Id.
158. See Eshoo Introduces OPCA, supra note 143. See also Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (1996).
159. See Eshoo Introduces OPCA, supra note 143.
160. See Online Parental Control Act of 1996, HR. 3089, 104th Cong. (1996); Executive
Summary: The Online Parental Control Act of 1996 (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www-
.eshoo.house.gov/
opca.suTn.html> [hereinafter Executive Summary]. See also Background, Questions &
Answers, supra note 142.
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The Online Parental Control Act of 1996 defines "harmful to
minors" as sexually explicit matter which meets all of the following
criteria:
(A) Considered as a whole, the matter appeals to the prurient
interest of minors.
(B) The matter is patently offensive as determined by contem-
porary local community standards in terms of what is suitable
for minors.
(C) Considered as a whole, the matter lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, educational, or scientific value for minors."'
Unlike the "indecency" standard used in CDA,'62 the "harmful
to minors" standard is narrower in that it excludes from liability
material which provides serious value to minors in the form of
literary, artistic, political, educational, or scientific information. 63
Eshoo, the original sponsor of OPCA, is optimistic about the
constitutionality of the proposed law since the "harmful to minors"
standard has worked in forty-eight states to date."6 Because the
"harmful to minors" standard narrows the scope of information
likely to be affected by the regulation, many constitutional attacks
should be quieted.165  Under this standard, nonobscene material
is regulated only with respect to the distribution and exhibition to
minors. 66 Supposedly, no outright prohibition will be placed on
adult speech. However, sexually explicit files, not considered
obscene for adult viewing, shall not be uploaded, or otherwise
made available for downloading, to minors.' 6 Adults are free to
upload and download information for other adults to view. Yet, it
remains questionable whether a sender can adequately and feasibly
restrict the transmission to adults only, keeping the information out
of the eyesight of minors. The anonymity of the Internet is still
alive and well.
161. H.R. 3089. The United States Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. United States, 390 U.S.
629 (1968), found that the interpretation given by the New York Court of Appeals to the
term "harmful to minors" was "virtually identical to the Supreme Court's most recent
statement of the elements of obscenity." Id. at 643.
162. See ACLU v, Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1996). See supra Part III.
163, See H.R. 3089. See also Executive Summary, supra note 155; Background, Questions
& Answers, supra note 142.
164. See Eshoo Introduces OPCA, supra note 143.
165. See An Interview with Congresswoman Anna Eshoo-
Communications Decency Act Under Fire, supra note 140, at IA08.
166. See CAVANOZ & MORIN, supra note 2, at 98 (relying on Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629).
167. See id.
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In previous cases, the Supreme Court has resolved the question
in the negative as to whether the "harmful to minors" standard is
unconstitutional per se under a "void for vagueness" attack.' 6 In
a case involving a luncheonette owner who was convicted of selling
"girlie" magazines to a sixteen year old and who was prosecuted
under a criminal obscenity statute using the "harmful to minors"
test, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the standard.6 9
The luncheonette owner argued that the term "harmful to minors"
was "so vague that an honest distributor of publications cannot
know when he might be held to have violated" the statute."'
However, the Court ruled that the term provides adequate notice
to potential violators and, therefore, is not in violation of the Due
Process Clause." The definition was construed as "virtually
identical to the Supreme Court's most recent statement of the
elements of obscenity.,
172
The "harmful to minors" standard, as used in OPCA, provides
for an additional element that must be proven before a person is
prosecuted under the Act. As opposed to the indecency standard,
such as the one used in CDA, every statute which bars dissemina-
tion of materials that are "harmful to minors" must include an
element of scienter as part of the offense. 173 It is this element of
"knowingly" that avoids "the hazard of self-censorship of constitu-
tionally protected material" and compensates "for the ambiguities
inherent in the definition of indecency." 174 Therefore, while not
every utterance is protected by the First Amendment, like the
Hicklin test, the "harmful to minors" test should constitutionally
differentiate between protected and unprotected speech. Neverthe-
less, the "harmful to minors" test is still based on a community
standard in a medium where no one can define the precise
community. "'




172. Id. The elements for determining what is obscene have been fully set forth in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). The "harmful to minors" standard
contained within OPCA is essentially the same test proferred by Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973), only adapted for minors. Background, Questions & Answers, supra note 142.
173. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S, at 644.
174. Id.
175. See discussion infira Part I.C.
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C. The Internet Community and OPCA
The Online Parental Control Act, like CDA, determines what
is deemed "harmful to minors" according to community standards.
However, when using areas on the Internet such as newsgroups, it
is impossible to determine the geographic location of the message
receiver. 7' The only reasonable assumption to be made is that
the reader is "everywhere."177 Unlike phone sex providers, the
Internet user cannot tailor the message to specific environments or
control the localities over which information is disseminated."8
A person in New York could use his access password to log-in
though a remote site in Wisconsin,'79 locations where community
standards would certainly differ. Therefore, a user is presented
with two choices: either limit speech so that it is only accessible to
those persons in specific areas or gear the speech to the most
sensitive community possible.18° Such choices certainly curtail a
great quantity of constitutionally protected speech.
Both the Online Parental Control Act and the Communica-
tions Decency Act use a community standard to judge the proscrip-
tion of material and fail to provide a feasible manner of limiting
material to certain recipients. Thus, there appears to be little
additional First Amendment protection afforded by the Online
Parental Control Act. However, "the fact that 'distributors of
allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying community
standards in the various federal judicial districts into which they
transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitu-
tional for failure to apply uniform national standards of obscen-
ity."""' Currently, both broadcasted and written media are
subject to regulation although the community is not easily deter-
mined.
In determining the constitutionality of CDA, the court in Shea
recognized that the national community standard is not a novel
problem; it has existed since the time that communications
176. See Sergent, supra note 14, at 712. See also supra Part II,
177. See Sergent, supra note 14, at 712.
178, See id. at 711. See also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989) (discussing the regulation of dial-a-porn services).
179. See Sergent, supra note 14, at 712.
180. See id.
181. Sable, 492 U.S. at 125 (citing Hamlin v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)).
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transcended local community boarders. 8 2 Like content providers
on the Internet, magazine distributors have their material subjected
to various community standards and, therefore, they must make an
evaluation about what to print.83 In Sable Communications of
California., Inc. v. FCC, a dial-a-porn provider challenged the
constitutionality of section 223(b) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, that banned indecent and obscene commercial
telephone messages." 4 As part of Sable's argument that the ban
on indecent and obscene interstate telephone messages was
unconstitutional, the provider argued that the statute created a
national community standard which required the company to tailor
its speech (the messages) to the "least tolerant community."'85
A nearly identical argument was made when Shea, on behalf
of American Reporter, challenged CDA under the theory of void
for vagueness since any material transmitted over the Internet
would be judged according to various community standards.'86 In
Sable and Shea, both the Supreme Court and the United States
Court for the Southern District of New York, rejected this void for
vagueness argument.8 7 In Sable, the Court found that to abide
by several community standards was no more restrictive than other
statutes which prohibit the mailing of obscene material'88 or the
broadcasting of obscene messages.'89 The burden of tailoring the
message to the standard of the community where the message will
be received is placed on the person sending or providing the
obscenity.9 " Therefore, based on the Court's previous rulings, it
is unlikely that anyone could successfully challenge the constitution-
ality of OPCA based on the requirement that material be judged
according to various community standards in determining whether
it is "harmful to minors." Nonetheless, the argument was made
and accepted by the district court that decided the ACLU's
182. See Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916,9389 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See
also Sable, 492 US. at 125-26.
183. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 937.
184. Sable, 492 U.S. at 124. Section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 is found
at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1997).
185. Sable, 492 U.S. at 124.
186. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 935-37.
187. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-25; Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 937.
188. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-25 (citing Hamlin v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 126.
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challenge to CDA 91 The constitutionality of a standard based
on an amorphous community will depend on the particular judges
deciding the case. Never has a community been so undefinable as
the Internet community.
D. OPCA-Overbroad in Censorship
The ACLU and Shea courts granted injunctions denying
authorities the right to enforce CDA based on a belief that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the argument that CDA was
unconstitutionally broad and violated the freedom of speech
afforded to adults. 92 The Supreme Court then, on the same
basis, ruled CDA to be unconstitutional.'93 The Court is likely to
be persuaded by a similar argument should OPCA be signed into
law. "The doctrine of overbreadth recognizes that an unconstitu-
tional restriction of freedom of expression may deter parties not
before the court from engaging in protected speech and thereby
escape judicial review.""' Internet users may fear prosection and
thereby censor their speech rather than face the risk of a criminal
prosection. Adult speech must be given the highest protection.
The Shea court determined that CDA was content based
regulation and, as such, was to be evaluated according to the
strictest level of judicial scrutiny.195 OPCA similarly regulates the
content of speech being transmitted over the Internet,"6 and,
therefore, any future court is likely to apply the same strict level of
judicial scrutiny and find that the Act impedes upon the First
Amendment rights of adults to engage in free speech. While the
Supreme Court has clearly held that obscene speech is not
protected by the First Amendment,"9 OPCA, in reality, regulates
more than obscene speech under its "harmful to minors" standard.
If an Internet message sender cannot determine the applicable
community standard, the sender will fear the law and restrict
potential speech. In ACLU v. Reno, the court stated that if a law
chills the speech of adults, the law oversteps the boundaries of the
191. See generally ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849-50 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
192. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940-41; ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
193. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997).
194. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939.
195, See id. See also Reno v. ACLU 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
196. See generally H.R. 3089, 104th Cong. (1996).
197. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 124; accord Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-
72 (1942).
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Constitution and will be declared unconstitutional for being
overbroad.95 Therefore, it reasons that if OPCA is challenged
as being overbroad before a court similar to the district courts that
decided the constitutionality of CDA, OPCA also will likely be
found unconstitutional.
E Supplemental Affirmative Defenses
In ACLU v. Reno, while defending the constitutionality of
CDA, the federal government argued that even if the Act was
overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional, the two affirmative
defenses written into the statute cured any constitutionality
problems.'99 However, the Shea court rejected this argument
finding that the defenses provided no feasible relief to the persons
potentially affected by CDA.2 °' The proposed OPCA adds two
additional affirmative defenses to CDA. 0' The proposed Act
protects information content providers from civil or criminal
liability.2  As an additional affirmative defense, the Online
Parental Control Act provides:
(e) In addition to any other defenses available by law:
(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a)
or (d)203 solely for providing access or connection to or
from a facility, system or network not under the person's
control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate
storage access software, or other related capabilities that
are incidental to providing such access or connection that
does not include the creation of the content of the commu-
nication."
As applicable to Internet service providers, CDA created both
practical and legal problems."0 5 As part of a legal debate, service
198. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,854 (E.D. Pa. 1996). See also Sable, 492 U.S.
at 131.
199. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 829-30.
200. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950.
201. See Background, Questions & Answers, supra note 142. CDA created two good faith
defenses, subsections 3(a)(3)(C) and (D), that are preserved in OPCA. See H.R. 3089; Back-
ground, Questions & Answers, supra note 142.
202. See Background, Questions & Answers, supra note 142.
203 Subsection (d) relates to using a computer to send patently offensive material to
minors.
204. Telecommunications Act of t996, Pub, L. No. 104-104, § 223(e)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 134
(1996).
205. See Clean Up Internet's Porn Showing, THE LAWYER, Oct. 1, 1996, at 11.
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providers argued that it is the people that post the material who
must be held responsible for the content of what is transmitted, not
the providers who have no feasible way of policing che mater-
ial."° Almost anyone connected to a service can send and
distribute material over newsgroups, e-mail, and the World Wide
Web. °7 Therefore, ISPs claim that "they are just common
carriers and should be no more responsible than BT or the Post
Office are for the material they carry, though it can be argued that
ISP's should be held liable for material in a similar way to
broadcasters or publishers. 2 8  Recognizing the quandary in
which service providers are placed, the drafters of OPCA included
an affirmative defense that provides for an exclusion from liability
to service providers who take no part in the creation of the content
being transmitted." 9
The second affirmative defense added by OPCA shields from
prosecution employers who use the Internet as part of their
business. Accordingly, the Act states:
No employer shall be held liable under this section for the
actions of an employee or agent unless the employee's or
agent's conduct is within the scope of his or her employment or
agency and the employer (A) having knowledge of such conduct
authorizes or ratifies such conduct, or (B) recklessly disregards
such conduct.2t0
According to the language of this defense, an employer who makes
the Internet available to employees for business purposes is
immune from prosecution. The defense goes so far as to require
the prosecution to prove scienter in order to deny the employer the
right to use this defense; the employer must knowingly ratify the
content of the message being posted or sent by the employee in
order to be held to the penalties called for under OPCA. How-
ever, while OPCA provides more protection for Internet service
providers and employers, individual users continue to face the
problem of varying community standards and an inability of the
nonlegal mind to clearly determine that which is prohibited from




209. See § 223(e)(1), (4), 110 Stat. at 134.
210. § 223(e)(4), I10 Stat. at 134.
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Amendment activists, but if ISPs do not regulate content, who will
protect the children?
V. Leaving Censorship to Parents
A. The Platform for Internet Content Selection-PICS
In addition to the two supplementary affirmative defenses
provided, OPCA proposed the use of labeling or segregating
systems to restrict the access of minors to online materials by using
standards defined by the Platform for Internet Content Selection
("PICS").' PICS is seen as a solution to the problem of minors
accessing obscene, and parentally judged inappropriate, material
over the Internet"'2 irrespective of the passage of the Online
Parental Control Act.
The labeling and segregating standards proposed within the
Online Parental Control Act are similar to movie ratings and would
segregate material available over the Internet."3 An independent
segregating system could be used to label all incoming material
according to standards defined by PICS.2"4 PICS is simply "a
working group of high-technology companies who collectively
contribute to the establishment of standards for the Internet. ' '21 5
From there, individual companies create their own rating systems
according to PICS standards.
PICS, however, is not a rating system;" 6 instead, PICS is a
scheme for labeling transferred content.2"7 It provides a standard
211. See Background, Questions & Answers, supra note 142.
212. See Malcolm McDonald, Setting the Standards for Tagging Web Documents, THE
DOMINION (WELLINGTON), Oct. 14, 1996, at 1 (Nations).
213. David Phinney, Rep. Anna Eshoo Seeks to Save Internet Free Speech, STATES NEWS
SERVICE, Mar, 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Current News File.
214. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (ED. Pa. 1996). PICS was created by the
World Wide Web Consortium. "PICS is the cross-industry working group assembled under
the auspices of MIT's World Wide Web Consortium to develop an easy-to-use Internet
content labeling and selection platform that empowers people worldwide to selectively
control online content they receive through personal computers," Executive Summary, supra
note 155.
215. Net Shepherd Inc. Promotes Global Standards for the Internet "World's First Label
Bureau to Foster Online Commnunities," CANADA NEWSWIRE, Sept. 26, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Current News File [hereinafter Net Shepherd Inc.]. Members of PICS
include Digital Equipment, Apple, America Online, AT&T, CompuServe, IBM, Microsoft
and Net Shepherd Inc. See Background, Questions & Answers, supra note 142.
216. Roger J Merger, Here are Some Ways to Prattice Safe Surfing, THE RECORD
(O1O), Sept. 16, 1996, at B02.
217. See McDonald, Setting the Standard, supra note 206, at 1.
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format for labeling so that any PICS compliant software can
process any label that is also PICS compliant. 28  PICS "estab-
lished Internet conventions for labeling formats and distribution
methods while dictating neither a labeling vocabulary nor who
should pay attention to which labels."2 9  It is the selection
software using PICS' standards that will determine whether a
person will be permitted access to certain material.22
B. Selection Software
Should the Supreme Court determine that Congress cannot
constitutionally regulate the Internet, one solution to the problem
of minor children accessing pornographic and other inappropriate
information over the Internet may be parental supervision with the
aid of computer selection software. Companies have developed
several different software packages to rate and censor information
available over the Internet. Net Shepherd Inc. developed the
world's first PICS compliant server that encourages everyone within
the Internet community to rate materials found while surfing the
net." ' Under the Net Shepherd program, a "Collaborative
Rating of Content (CRC)" scale rates information based on
maturity and quality.222 The maturity scale, which responds to
the concerns of parents, teachers, and librarians attempting to
protect minors from inappropriate materials, includes categories
such as "General, Child, Pre-Teen, Teen, Adult, and Inappropri-
ate.''223 Then, an adult can assign to each child an appropriate
access level based on what that adult deems appropriate.2 4
Parents, rather than the government, judge the appropriateness of
information for their child and protected adult speech is not
abridged.
Another software system available to parents is the Net Nanny
3.0.22
5 This system has the capabilities to screen "URLs, News-
218. See Paul Resnick & James Miller, PICS: Internet Access Control without Censorship,
COMMUNICATIONS OF TFfe ACM, Oct. 1996, at 88.
219. Id. at 87.
220. See id. at 88.
221. See Net Shepherd Inc., supra note 209.




225. See Net Nanny Announces v3.0 of Its Award Winning Parental Control Software Has
Been Released to Manufacturing; New 32 Bit Version Adds New Access Control Features and
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Groups, chat lines, programs, files, words 
and phrases .... 226
Under this system, parents can block CD-ROMs and prevent
inappropriate files from being accessed. Parents also 
have the
ability to turn this screening device on and off via an administration
program within the computer that is accessed only by means 
of a
password.228  'The cost of this system is $39.95229 making 
selec-
tion software available to most users.
For parents who do not want the hassle of installing software
on their personal computers, yet another option is 
available.
SafeSurf, an additional Internet screening device, filters out 
adult
material at the server level and eliminates the need 
to install
filtering devices onto individual computers.
230  Parents may
subscribe to this system through a variety of ISPs for a rate of 
three
to five dollars per month.
23 Furthermore, the company offers a
customizable filtering device for internal networks that updates
itself every 24 hours. 32 In addition to Net Nanny and SafeSurf,
other available software includes Specs for Kids, CYBERsitter,
CyberPatrol,233 SurfWatch, and Microsoft Internet Explorer
3 .0.234
SurfWatch, CyberPatrol 3.0, and Microsoft Internet Explorer
3.0 use the RSACI rating system based on PICS' standard; all 
three
are designed by the Recreational Software Advisory Council
Enhanced Performance, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 31, 1996, available in 
LEXIS, News Library,
Current News File [hereinafter Net Nanny Announces].
226. ld. The Net Nanny screens both mail coming into the 
home over the Internet and
the information sent out from the home to the Internet. Resources 
for Parental Control of
Internet Content (visited Feb. 1, 1997) <http://www.cms.K12.nc.us/PC.html>.
227. See Net Nanny Announces, supra note 219.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See SafeSurf Releases ISP Filtering System 10/23/96, NEWSBYTES, 
Oct. 23, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Current News File.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. CyberPatrol is available to CompuServe subscribers free 
of charge. See Programs
Jhat Act Like a Net Nanny, TiE BUFFALO NEWs (N.Y.), Oct. 8, 
1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Current News File.
234 All of these programs are available to the public for 
purchase prices below fifty
dollars, however, some require an annual subscription fee. 
Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0
can be downloaded for free at http://www.iicrosoft.com; 
SurfWatch is available for $49.95
plus an annual subscription fee of $60.00; CyberPatrol costs 
$29.95 to $54.95, plus an nnual
fee of $29.95 to $34.95; CYBERsitter costs $39.95; 
Net Nanny costs $39.95, and Specs for
Kids is free for one year. See id. At these fairly 
affordable prices, selection software is made
available t the majority of Internet users.
19971
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(RSAC) 5  Under this system, Web site developers voluntarily
rate their material based on a scale of one to four in four distinct
categories. 236 These categories include violence, nudity, sex, and
language. 37 Parents are given a password which enables them to
set the appropriate level of each category for their child 38 While
this seems to be a feasible alternative to legal regulation of the
Internet, unfortunately, only about 4,000 Web sites have rated
themselves according to this system.2 9 However, the possibility
exists for federal laws to require ISPs to provide such services.
An alternative to software screening programs is for parents to
select child friendly areas on the Internet and allow their children
to explore only these areas. Yahoo's Yahooligans2 ° lists sites on
the Internet that are appropriate for eight to fourteen year old
children.24 Parents can also search The Ultimate Children's
Internet Sites list and The Internet Kids Yellow Pages to determine
appropriate sites for their children to explore. 2
VI. Conclusion-Outlook for Regulating the Internet
The Internet is plagued with individuals transmitting sexually
laden communication that inevitably lands into the laps of children.
In a first attempt to protect the children, Congress passed the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 which was quickly ruled
unconstitutional. The government has continued its efforts to
protect the children by proposing the Online Parental Control Act
of 1996.
However, it is unlikely that the federal government will ever
successfully draft and enact constitutional legislation that will
effectively block the dissemination of pornography to Internet
minors. When considering CDA, United States District Judge
Stewart wrote: "These findings lead to the conclusion that
Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet at all. Just
235. See Merger, supra note 210, at B02.
236. See id.
237. A zero rating is given when no content in that category is contained within the
material; a rating of four is given when explicit content of that category is contained within
the material. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. This cite can be accessed at http://www.yahoo.com.
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as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our
liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered
speech the First Amendment protects. '243  Furthermore, Chief
Judge Dolores Sloviter of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit described enforcement of the Internet as "technologically
impossible," "economically prohibitive," and unconstitutional.2'
Due to the very nature of the Internet, defining a community
by which to judge potentially offensive material is impossible.
Therefore, any federal law will be overbroad in effect and,
therefore, will lead to a ruling of unconstitutionalit. Parents must
step forward and assume the responsibility of protecting their own
children. The innovation of worldwide communication comes at a
price. The developers of selection software have provided an
option. The United States, along with the rest of the world, has
entered into a new world of technology. Those parents who allow
their children to participate in that technology must also accept the
responsibility of monitoring their children.
Kimberly A. Gobla
243. Wouters, supra note 88.
244. Id.

